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Japan’s Responds to China’s Rise:  
Regional Engagement, Global Containment,  
Dangers of Collision 
 
Christopher W. Hughes 
 
Introduction: Japan struggles to maintain engagement options 
Japan is presented with multidimensional challenges—political, economic, security 
and environmental—by China’s rise. Japan’s ability as an individual state actor or in 
cooperation with other collective state actors to respond to these challenges, or as 
some Japanese policy-makers might daresay ‘threats’, and to influence the course of 
China’s rise in East Asia is perhaps second only to that of the US. Japanese 
engagement with China in the past, at the government and private business levels, has 
been crucial in assisting the latter’s reinsertion into the East Asian regional political 
economy. Similarly, Japan’s future choices about pursuing cooperation and 
competition with China will continue to impact on the latter’s regional rise. Indeed, 
Japan and China’s ability to manage their relations is often seen as a crucial test of 
China’s future position in the region, with scenarios for Sino-Japanese relations 
ranging from peaceful coexistence to downward spirals of confrontation and even 
military conflict.1 Finally, Japan’s response to the rise of China is set to impact not 
                                                 
1 Bill Emmott, Rivals: how the power struggle between China, India and Japan will shape our next 
decade (London: Allen Lane, 2008); Denny Roy, ‘The sources and limits of Sino-Japanese tensions’, 
Survival 42: 2, Summer 2005, pp. 191-214.  
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just regionally but also now on a global scale. For just as China’s rise has inevitably 
involved an expansion of its global reach, so Japan’s responses to the challenges 
posed by China have increasingly taken global form, seeking to incorporate new 
partners and frameworks outside East Asia, and thus helping to shape the prospects 
for China’s engagement with other regions.  
 
The argument of this article is that Japan in today responding to China’s rise is 
certainly attempting to maintain the default engagement strategy that has 
predominated for the post-war period. Japan remains intent on promoting China’s 
external engagement with the East Asia region and its internal domestic reform. Japan 
has demonstrated continuities in its engagement strategy by employing or upgrading 
extant bilateral and Japan-China-US trilateral frameworks for dialogue and 
cooperation, and by persisting in emphasising the importance of economic power as 
the most effective means to influence China. Japan’s domestic policy-making 
constituencies remain relatively disposed towards engagement, thereby reinforcing 
this overall state strategy.  
 
However, at the same time as this article evaluates the continuities and degree of 
impact of Japan’s long-term engagement strategy upon China’s rise, it seeks to 
consider those newer means by which Japan has sought to respond to China, their 
effectiveness in promoting engagement, but also how these have the potential to 
produce deviation, and even radical divergence, from Japan’s standard engagement 
policy. Hence, the article incorporates within its scope not only Japan’s response to 
China’s rise within East Asia through utilising traditional forms of power and 
partnerships, but just as importantly to analyse Japan’s responses through activating 
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new forms of power and through forging new partnerships within and beyond East 
Asia. Specifically, the article investigates Japan’s response to China by augmenting 
its military capabilities and so-called ‘soft’ power, and by reasserting its influence in 
Russia, Australia, India, Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, Europe, and the United 
Nations (UN). It considers how Japan’s experimentation with the expansion of its 
capabilities and mechanisms to respond to China is designed to foster Sino-Japanese 
engagement, either by creating opportunities for direct bilateral cooperation on shared 
agendas in these regions, or by checking and channelling Chinese influence and thus 
persuading its leadership to reach an accommodation with Japan over strategic 
interests in these regions and within East Asia.  
 
The article demonstrates, though, that Japanese responses to China as well as creating 
possibilities for cooperation carry the risk of over-stimulating Sino-Japanese 
competition and creating the very downward spiral of confrontation they are designed 
to obviate. Japan and China may find their strategic interests at fundamental 
loggerheads in East Asia and other regions, either as Japan frustrates China’s regional 
and global ambitions, or, as is more likely at present, Japan finds itself coming up 
short in resources to effectively counter China’s rise. Moreover, the article argues that 
the domestic political bases for Japan’s relations with China although still predisposed 
to engagement remain highly precarious, and that any frustration of Japan’s attempts 
to prevent the relative erosion of its power position in East Asia and globally vis-à-vis 
China may further tip its towards revisionist and nationalist resentment.  
 
The result of Japan’s perceived exhaustion of its options for engagement, despite 
strenuous and innovative regional and global activity, and to thus assert an effective 
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hold on China’s rise, could be to force it on the defensive and to shift precipitously to 
a default policy of containment. Japan has already shown signs of this containment 
policy founded inevitably on the further enhancement of its own military power, 
tighter US-Japan security cooperation, and active, if quiet, balancing against China. 
However, inherent in this strategy are obvious risks of exacerbating regional tensions 
with China, and less apparent but even greater risks of stimulating Japanese tensions 
with both China and the US. Japan and China’s failure to reconcile their interests 
would also carry negative externalities for the future of the wider East Asia region and 
for other regions where they have played out proxy power competition.  
 
Japan’s default engagement strategy 
Japanese policy-makers responsible for reconstructing Sino-Japanese relations in the 
post-war period, and even in the wake of the fallout from Japanese colonialism and 
China’s externally and internally-imposed isolation during the Cold War and Cultural 
Revolution, have perceived that China is too important a long term political, 
economic and even security partner to be cut adrift from relations with Japan and the 
rest of East Asia.2 Consequently, Japanese policy for most of the Cold War period 
was focussed on strengthening reform-minded leaders in China, assisting internal 
stabilisation, and the reestablishment of China as a key bilateral trading partner. 
Japanese security concerns relating to China were highly limited, given China’s 
restricted military capabilities, and Japan’s backstop reliance on the US-Japan 
Security Treaty.  
 
                                                 
2 Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes and Hugo Dobson, Japan’s international 
relations: politics, economics and security (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 191-192. 
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In turn, Japan’s engagement of China was undergirded by strong domestic 
constituencies. Japan’s policy towards China under the so-called ‘1955 political 
system’ of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) governance was generally controlled by 
the ‘Pragmatist’, technocratic, mainstream of the party, represented by Prime 
Ministers Yoshida Shigeru and Ikeda Hayato. Yoshida summed up the Pragmatists’ 
pro-engagement position with his remark in 1951 that: ‘Red or white, China remains 
our next-door neighbour. Geography and economic laws will, I believe, prevail in the 
long run over any ideological differences and artificial trade barriers’. 3  The 
‘Revisionist’, more economically liberal, and politically nationalistic, wing of the 
party represented by Prime Ministers Kishi Nobusuke and Satō Eisaku, in line with 
their position as Cold War warriors and staunch US allies, tended to favour capitalist 
Taiwan. 4  However, the Pragmatists, in cooperation with other pro-engagement 
policy-making agents, including the opposition parties of the Kōmeitō (Clean 
Government Party), Japan Socialist Party (JSP), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA), and much of big business, succeeded in nudging Japan onto a consistent 
engagement track.  
 
Japan accelerated engagement with China following Sino-US rapprochement in 1972, 
which removed the principal international structural barrier for Japan to improved ties. 
Japan normalised ties with China in the same year and concluded the Treaty of Peace 
and Friendship in 1978. Japan and China in this process of initiating direct political 
and economic ties deliberately shelved issues of the colonial past and territorial 
                                                 
3 Shigeru Yoshida, ‘Japan and the crisis in Asia’, Foreign Affairs, 29: 2, January 1951, p. 179. 
4 Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s grand strategy and the future of East Asia (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 2007).  
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disputes in the East China Sea over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islets. Japan was then able 
to bring its full economic power to bear on bilateral ties. Japan by the early 1980s was 
the largest donor of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China, and between 
1979 and 2005 disbursed a total of ¥3,133 billion in loans, ¥145.7 billion in grant aid, 
and ¥144.6 billion in technical cooperation.5 Japan by the late 1980s had emerged as a 
major investor and trader with China, and the Ministry of Economy Trade and 
Industry (METI) had begun to conceptualise China’s place within a Japanese-led 
regional production order.  
 
Japan-China relations were not entirely free of tensions, and were hit periodically by 
Japan’s reporting of its colonial past in history textbooks in 1982 and 1986, Prime 
Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine in 1985, and Chinese 
perceptions of Japan’s remilitarisation in response to US-Japan alliance strategy to 
counter rising Soviet power. However, Japan’s domestic political ‘1955 system’ and 
the ‘1972 system’ of diplomatic relations with China worked in tandem to maintain 
engagement, with even the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident failing to derail bilateral 
relations.6  
 
Japan’s post-Cold War engagement strategy: emerging discontinuities 
Japan in the post-Cold War period has been presented with a range of new challenges 
by the rise of China. Japan’s 1955 domestic political system and the 1972 system of 
                                                 
5  Reinhard Drifte, ‘The end of Japan’s ODA yen loan programme to China in 2008 and its 
repercussions’, Japan aktuell, January 2008, p. 3. 
6 Ming Wan, Sino-Japanese relations: interaction, logic and transformation (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 83-108.  
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bilateral interaction governing Sino-Japanese relations are thus now giving way to 
new structures for cooperation and enhanced competition.  
 
China’s new political, economic, and security challenges 
Japan in the political dimension now has to contend with a rising and rapidly 
transforming China which is perceived as less stable domestically, increasingly 
nationalistic, and thus more willing to confront Japan over issues of the colonial past. 
China’s rise has presented Japan with concerns that it is being edged out of its 
position as the dominant East Asian state and leader of regional integration efforts. 
Japan’s previous ‘special relationship’ with the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) has been jeopardised by China’s southward engagement with this 
subregion; and Japan has been disturbed by South Korea’s flirtation with closer ties 
with China. 7  Japanese concerns about East Asia turning towards a new form of 
Chinese World Order have been compounded by the perception that China is 
exercising new forms of ‘soft power’ through the dissemination of culture and the so-
called ‘Beijing Consensus’.8  
 
Japanese policy-makers are even more alarmed by the impact of China’s rise on their 
state’s previously unassailable position as the economic powerhouse of East Asia. 
Japan’s deepening bilateral economic integration with China has been an important 
force for cooperation at the non-state and intergovernmental levels, but it has raised 
                                                 
7 David Shambaugh, ‘China engages Asia: reshaping the regional order’, International Security, 29: 3, 
Winter 2004/2005, pp. 75-78, 79-80. 
8 Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing consensus (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2004).  
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Japanese anxieties that it may result in a relationship of asymmetric interdependence 
weighted towards China.9
 
Japan’s economic pre-eminence is further challenged by China’s supercharged growth 
since the mid-1990s, meaning that it has failed to conform to Japanese concepts for an 
orderly regional production and investment hierarchy in East Asia, with Japan at is 
head, followed by the Newly Industrialised Economies (NIES), ASEAN, and then 
China. Instead, China has threatened to leapfrog to the second tier, if not top tier, of 
the hierarchy in various sectors.10 Japan has also felt challenged by China’s intrusion 
into its traditional economic space of ASEAN through the rapid conclusion of 
bilateral free trade agreements (FTA), and through the propagation of an alternative 
Chinese developmental model predicated on the ‘Beijing Consensus’. Finally, Japan’s 
ability to influence the development of China’s political economy is seen to have 
declined in line with the decline in its provision of ODA. Japan’s feeling that China’s 
economic development has meant that it has outgrown the need for ODA, combined 
with concerns that China may have diverted ODA to non-developmental purposes, 
has forced it to cease yen loans to China since 2008, and Japan now only provides 
grant aid principally for environmental cooperation. 
 
Japan’s economic security concerns vis-à-vis China are increasingly outstripped by 
new military concerns. Japan’s indifference to China’s military threat during the Cold 
                                                 
9  David C. Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia, New York, Columbia 
University Press, 2007, pp. 176-177. 
10 Andrew Macintyre and Barry Naughton, ‘The decline of a Japan-led model of the East Asian 
economy’, in T. J. Pempel (ed.) Remapping East Asia: the construction of a region (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 2005), pp. 77-100. 
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War has been replaced by a new sense that, if North Korea poses the major short-term 
threat, then China is the greatest long-term threat to national security.11  Japanese 
policy-makers are anxious about China’s modernisation of its conventional and 
nuclear capabilities, its continuing double digit increases in defence expenditure, the 
general lack of transparency in its military planning, and signs that its neighbour is 
now willing to project power beyond its immediate borders. Japanese policy-makers 
interpreted the 1995-1996 Taiwan Straits crises as an indication of China’s growing 
appetite to assert its power and to potentially challenge the US presence in the region. 
Japan is aware that China could disrupt its Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) with 
only a small blue-water naval capacity. China’s constant despatch of ‘research ships’ 
and warships into Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) around the disputed 
Senkaku/Diaoyutai islets are taken as evidence of aggressive intent. Japan-China 
bilateral frictions have also been triggered since early 2005 due to China’s exploration 
activities in natural gas fields in the East China Sea abutting onto Japan’s EEZ 
claim—Japan fearing that China could draw off gas resources on its side of the seabed, 
and adding competition for energy resources to the bilateral security mix.  
  
Japan’s slipping domestic foundations for engagement 
Japan can thus now be seen to face a series of Chinese challenges which exceed the 
confines of the previous 1972 system for engagement, necessitating a shift from a 
simple focus on economic cooperation and aversion to political conflict, and now 
making for inherent tensions over colonial history, territorial claims, trade and 
production, developmental paradigms, energy security, and military security. Japan-
                                                 
11 Christopher W. Hughes, ‘“Super-sizing” the DPRK threat: Japan’s evolving military posture and 
North Korea’, Asian Survey, 49, 2, March/April 2009, forthcoming. 
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China engagement has been further potentially weakened by the unravelling of the 
1955 political system. Japan’s economic malaise since the early 1990s has raised 
fundamental questions about the competency and legitimacy of the LDP. The LDP 
Pragmatists after exhausting the financial and political possibilities to maintain their 
party’s grip on power through practising the politics of redistribution have been 
forced to cede ground to the resurgent Revisionists. As personified by Prime Minister 
Koizumi Junichirō’s tenure in office (2001-2006), the Revisionists have brought with 
them neo-liberal prescriptions of Japan’s economic revival but also a more nationalist 
agenda. The Revisionists have consequently shown a reluctance to submit to China 
over issues of colonial history; a degree of ideological opposition to China as an 
authoritarian state and concomitant sympathy towards democratic Taiwan; and a 
desire to pursue a larger military role for Japan individually and in cooperation with 
the US.12  
 
Koizumi’s revisionist stance in part explains his persistence in paying annual visits to 
Yasukuni Shrine from 2001 to 2006, near total neglect of Sino-Japanese relations, and 
preference for strengthening US-Japan ties. Koizumi’s period in office produced the 
worst Sino-Japanese relations since normalisation, marked by the failure to realise a 
bilateral summit for close to five years between 2001 and 2006, renewed disputes 
over the revisionist content of textbooks, and anti-Japanese riots in China in April 
2005.  
 
                                                 
12 Christopher W. Hughes, ‘Japan’s policy towards China: domestic structural change, globalization, 
history and nationalism’, in Christopher M. Dent, ed., China, Japan and regional leadership in East 
Asia (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008), pp. 37-51. 
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Koizumi’s successors have varied in their degree of Revisionist zeal. Abe Shinzō 
(2005-2006), the grandson of Kishi Nobusuke, displayed an attachment to revisionism 
far more articulate and consequently an even stronger latent distrust of China. 13  
Fukuda Yasuo (2006-2007), although drawn from the same Revisionist LDP faction 
was far more pro-China, and sought to fully rehabilitate bilateral ties, following in the 
footsteps of his father, Fukuda Takeo, who had concluded the 1978 Treaty of Peace 
and Friendship. Asō Tarō (2007-), despite being the grandson of Yoshida Shigeru, 
holds highly revisionist views and has in the past described China as a ‘threat’ to 
Japan.14 Japanese elite suspicions of China are echoed to some extent by popular 
sentiment, with government polls showing that between 1988 and 2005 the proportion 
of Japanese feeling a sense of amity towards China declined from around 70 to 30 per 
cent, whilst those feeling that bilateral ties were in a good condition declined from 
around 55 to 35 per cent.15   
 
However, it is still the case that there remain powerful Japanese domestic forces for 
engagement. The LDP’s Pragmatists, despite their recent marginalisation at the hands 
of the Revisionists, remain committed to engagement with China. The main 
opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), although containing its own Revisionist-
                                                 
13 Abe Shinzō, Utsukushii Nippon e (Tokyo: Bunshun Shinsho, 2006). 
14 Asō as the then Minister of Foreign Affairs remarked in a press conference in regard to China: ‘A 
neighbour with one billion people, possessed of nuclear bombs and its military budget growing by 
double digits for seventeen consecutive years. And if its content is unclear, as a consequence my 
feeling is that it is on the course to constitute a considerable threat’. Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Press Conference by Foreign Minister Taro Aso’, 22 December 2005, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm_press/2005/12/1222.html. 
15 Mōri Kazuko, Nicchū kankei: sengo kara shinjidai e (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 2006), pp. 193-196. 
 11
type politicians, has sought to portray itself as the party of engagement with China, 
and to embarrass past LDP prime ministers over their inability to secure dialogue with 
China. The New Kōmeitō as the LDP’s current coalition partner has pushed 
Koizumi’s successors towards re-strengthening ties with China. MOFA and METI 
remain predisposed to engagement, and are increasingly joined and supported in the 
international arena by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) as a key bureaucratic actor 
responsible for financial cooperation with China. Japan’s mass media and big 
business have likewise been opposed to any moves by the Koizumi and the LDP to 
antagonise China.   
 
The outcome is that despite China’s multifarious challenges to Japan, and the 
precarious nature of the Japanese domestic policy-making system, Japan’s essential 
response to China’s regional rise has remained a strategy of engagement. Indeed, 
Japan’s Revisionist leaders, even against their very political instincts, have found 
themselves resorting to default policies of engagement.  
 
‘A mutually beneficial relationship founded on common strategic interests’? 
Hence, following the departure of Koizumi, Abe made his first overseas trip as prime 
minister to Beijing in October 2006 to re-establish bilateral dialogue, with a reciprocal 
visit by Premier Wen Jiabao to Japan in April 2007. Fukuda further pushed this 
agenda with a visit to China in December 2007, followed by President Hu Jintao’s 
visit to Japan in May 2008, and Asō has persisted with the policy by visiting China in 
October 2008. Japanese policy-makers have sought to revitalise bilateral ties through 
the establishment of a ‘Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic 
Interests’. Abe initiated this approach during his October 2006 visit, and started by 
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tackling the issue of history. Japan and China agreed to establish a Joint History 
Research Committee, and to thereby depoliticise the issue of the colonial past and 
demote it on the bilateral agenda.16 Abe’s visit yielded the asssent of both sides to 
future cooperation on a range of issues including finance, energy, environmental 
protection, defence exchanges, the East China Sea, and North Korea’s 
denuclearisation. Abe and then Fukuda proceeded to inject substance into these 
agreements during subsequent bilateral summits. Japan and China launched their High 
Level Economic Dialogue in April 2007, and at the same time concluded a Joint 
Statement on the Further Enhancement of Cooperation for Environmental Protection. 
Japan and China followed these steps with the first exchanges of warship port visits in 
December 2006 and June 2007, and Japan even came close to the despatch of Air Self 
Defence Force (ASDF) aircraft to provide humanitarian aid to the victims of the 
Sichuan earthquake in 2008. This would have been the first despatch of the Japanese 
military to the Chinese interior since 1945, but although acceptable to China’s 
leadership, this move was halted by Chinese public opposition expressed via the 
internet.  
 
Japan and China’s ‘mutually beneficial relationship’ has had as its centrepiece, 
however, attempts to resolve the East China Sea dispute. Japan and China agreed in 
June 2008 that Japanese enterprises would be allowed to ‘participate’ in the ongoing 
development of the Shirakaba (Chunxiao) field, that the Asunaru (Longjing) be 
designated as a ‘joint development area’, and that they would continue consultations 
on next steps in the other two fields Kashi (Tianwaitian) and Kusonoki (Duanqiao). 
                                                 
16 Kitaoka Shinichi, ‘Japan-China joint history research gets under way’, Gaiko Forum, 7: 2, fall 2007, 
pp. 3-13. 
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Japanese analysts have questioned the exact meaning of ‘participation’ and how far 
China will allow joint exploitation of the gas fields. However, Japanese policy-makers 
have expressed relative satisfaction with the deal because Japan came late to the 
exploitation of the East China Sea and the geographical position of the fields makes 
them difficult to exploit solely by Japan. More importantly, Japan feels it can claim 
that China has in effect recognised the status quo in acknowledging Japan’s right to 
share in the gas fields and has thus yielded on its assertion to exclusive sovereignty.  
 
US-Japan alliance ties and China: trilateralism from US-Japan bilateralism? 
Japan’s persistence in engaging China bilaterally appears to have delivered important 
outcomes in moderating the impact of its regional rise. Japanese policy-makers, 
though, have not just continued to rely on bilateral mechanisms but also to buttress 
their efforts through existing, if transforming, Japan-US-China trilateral frameworks. 
For Japan, even though the relationship with the US no longer sets the overall 
international parameters for relations with China, the maintenance of the US presence 
in East Asia remains crucial to respond to China’s growing economic and political 
power, and most essentially to provide US-Japan alliance security guarantees. 
Japanese policy-makers clearly prefer relatively symmetrical trilateral relations, with 
Japan maintaining close alliance ties with the US, but also sufficient closeness of 
Sino-Japanese relations to maintain bilateral cooperation, and sufficient closeness of 
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Sino-US relations to foster cooperation and to afford Japan an important mediating 
role.17  
Japan, in order to maintain the US presence and the US-Japan side of the trilateral 
framework, has devoted considerable policy energy since the mid-1990s to the 
incremental strengthening of US-Japan alliance cooperation. Japan and the US in 
reaction to the reaction to the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994-1995 and the 
Taiwan Straits of 1995-1996 have gradually shifted the focus of the bilateral security 
treaty from the defence of Japan to wider questions of responding to regional 
contingencies in the Far East, demonstrated by the 1996-1997 revision of the US-
Japan Guidelines for Defence Cooperation which for the first time specified Japan’s 
rear area logistical cooperation for US regional power projection. Japanese and US 
ambitions for expanding the scope of alliance cooperation were further demonstrated 
by the 2004-2006 Defence Policy Review Initiative (DPRI). The DPRI identified US-
Japan common regional strategic objectives, including a peaceful resolution to the 
Taiwan issue, and now also global strategic objectives; and additionally put in place a 
process for the strengthening US regional and global power projection from its bases 
in Japan, and for closer operational integration of the US military and the Japan Self 
Defence Forces (JSDF). Japan and US military integration has been promoted in 
particular by the joint development of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), designed to 
counter China’s ability to threaten US bases and power projection from Japan in the 
event of a Taiwan Straits contingency.  
                                                 
17 Michael Jonathan Green, ‘Managing Chinese power: the view from Japan’, in Alaistair Iain Johnston 
and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: the management of an emerging power (London: Routledge, 
1999), pp. 161-162 
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Moreover, at the same time as Japan and the US have expanded the functional and 
geographical scope of alliance cooperation, Japan has quietly transformed its own 
national military capabilities and thus the capabilities designed to support US-Japan 
alliance objectives. Japan has sought to convert the JSDF from a Cold War-style 
military designed for the defence of national territory into a more flexible force with 
new power projection. Much of Japan’s national defence planning and procurement 
has involved shadowing the build-up of China’s military capabilities and to provide 
increasingly mobile defensive ‘shield’ functions to protect the US ‘sword’ of 
offensive power. 18  Japan has looked to respond to China’s acquisition of new 
submarine and blue-water naval capabilities by procuring for the Maritime Self 
Defence Force (MSDF) six highly advanced Aegis destroyers with BMD interceptors; 
two DDH Hyūga class vessels, which are designated as destroyers, but are in essence 
light helicopter carriers, displacing 13,500 tons and with a possible complement of 
eleven helicopters; and a new P-X replacement for its P-3C patrol and anti-submarine 
warfare aircraft with an 8,000 kilometre range suited to penetrating the further reaches 
of the South China Sea. The ASDF is seeking to counter China’s growing air defence 
capabilities by procuring a new F-X interceptor, with candidates including the US F-
22 and F-35 or Eurofighter.19 The JSDF in general has increasingly shifted its assets 
to focus on the defence of Japan’s southern islands from China. For instance, the 
ASDF for the first time in 2009 deployed twenty of its most capable F-15J fighters to 
Okinawa with the veiled intent of providing enhanced air defence against China. 
                                                 
18 Christopher W. Hughes and Ellis S. Krauss, ‘Japan’s new security agenda’, Survival: The IISS 
Quarterly, 49:2, 2007, 157-176. 
19 Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s remilitarisation (London, Routledge/IISS, 2009 forthcoming).  
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Japan’s strengthening of security ties with the US since the mid-1990s, whilst 
continuing to provide the essential security backstop to cope with China’s rise and to 
keep the US in the trilateral mechanism, raises clear alliance dilemmas. First off, 
Japan runs the risk of entrapment in US military strategy vis-à-vis China and 
becoming dragged into an unwanted Sino-US conflict, especially over Taiwan. 
Second, the US might consider that its interests are best served by emphasising ties 
with a rising China rather than stagnating Japan. In this instance, Japan, having pinned 
much of its security on dependence on the US, may find itself diplomatically and 
militarily abandoned. Japan received a taste of this ‘Japan passing’ in the latter stage 
of the Bill Clinton administration, when the US seemed intent on improving ties with 
China over the heads of its ally Japan.  
Japan has thus far mitigated the risks of entrapment and abandonment through 
calculated hedging tactics. In order to avoid entrapment, Japan has continued to 
obfuscate the full extent of its military commitment to the US, as shown by the 
process of the revision of the US-Japan Defence Guidelines in the mid-1990s, 
whereby Japan stressed its support for the US in regional contingencies was 
predicated on ‘situational’ rather than geographical need and thus left vague whether 
the Revised Guidelines actually covered a Taiwan Straits contingency. Similarly, 
Japan has avoided abandonment by its moves to shore up the US-Japan alliance since 
the mid-1990s. Nonetheless, Japanese policy-makers are aware that the US-Japan 




Japan’s new options for East Asian engagement: diluting Chinese 
power 
Japan’s redoubling of its efforts to manage China’s rise through adjusted bilateral and 
trilateral frameworks has been complemented by the emergence of new multilateral 
regional frameworks for engagement in the post-Cold War period. Japan during the 
Cold War and immediate post-Cold War periods had demonstrated limited interest in 
East Asia-centred regional frameworks as a means to engage China due to concerns 
that these frameworks might also shut out US interests from the region, as evidenced 
by Japan’s rejection in 1991 of the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) concept. 
However, following successful experiences of interaction with China in the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), and 
with the decline of overt US opposition to certain forms of East Asian regionalism 
during the Clinton administration, Japanese policy-makers have increasingly 
recognised the advantages of engaging China through a variety of East Asian 
frameworks.  
Japan, although an inadvertent originator of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) through its 
proposals in January 1997 for an ASEAN-Japan Summit which then became 
converted by ASEAN preferences into the wider forum first held in December of that 
year, has seen value in the forum for engaging China on functional issues such as 
regional finance. Japan’s earlier proposals for an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) were 
rejected by the US and China at the time of the 1997 financial crisis. However, 
Japan’s MOF has found that in the Chiang Mai Initiative introduced under the APT in 
2000 it has been able to establish close working relations with its Chinese counterpart, 
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and even that China is prepared to cede some leadership to Japan in matters of 
regional financial cooperation.20  
Japan, though, has been wary not to engage China solely through the APT framework. 
Japan was first disturbed that China in 2000 used the APT as a framework to prepare 
the groundwork for a thirteen-country FTA proposal, and it appeared that China might 
become the agenda and rule-setter for a more exclusive regional grouping. Japan has 
thus sought with other states, such as Singapore and Indonesia concerned about the 
potentially over-mighty influence of China, to promote additional forms of 
regionalism.21  
Koizumi first proposed an East Asian Community in Singapore in 2002 to counter 
China’s increasing influence in the APT, and Japan then succeeded in instigating by 
2005 the East Asian Summit (EAS) framework as a complementary grouping to the 
APT. Japan through this framework has been able to introduce Australia, New 
Zealand and India as partners to dilute China’s influence, and has even left open the 
possibility of the US joining the grouping. Japan has experimented with its own form 
of ‘soft power’ in the EAS by stressing its vision of an ‘open’ region, focussed on 
functional issues, and founded on the values of human rights and democracy and 
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conformity with global regimes.22 Japan’s intent is to juxtapose its more expansive 
vision of regionalism with a supposedly more Sino-centric and closed vision of a 
future regional order.  
In turn, Japan has sought to curb Chinese influence by proposing in 2007 its own 
sixteen-country Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in East Asia 
(CEPEA). Japan has responded to China’s growing influence in Southeast Asia by 
signing bilateral Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) with individual ASEAN 
states, and by pushing for the conclusion in April 2008 of a Japan-ASEAN 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), incorporating measures 
on free trade, investment, services, and economic cooperation. Japan has sold these 
agreements as qualitatively superior to China-ASEAN FTA agreements as they 
contain a full package of long-term and legally binding developmental benefits. Japan 
has further sought to engage China in Northeast Asia through the Japan-ROK-China 
Trilateral Summit, held for the first time in Japan in December 2008, and including 
calls for cooperation in trade, finance and the environment, and dialogue on Africa, 
the Korean Peninsula, non-proliferation, and UN reform.  
Japan’s approach to engaging China is thus to create a near surfeit of regional 
frameworks in order to dilute the latter’s rising power and to deny it clear or overall 
leadership in East Asia. Japan at the same time, though, in trying to place the question 
of regional leadership off limits to China, appears to be trying to induce it to focus 
instead on more functional issues such as financial cooperation. Japan’s engagement 
strategy, or what might be seen as verging on a ‘blocking’ strategy, has been 
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successful in preventing China from fully exerting its rising power. 23  However, 
Japan’s strategy is not without risks. Japan’s ability to exercise influence over 
ASEAN is doubtful given the fact that the EPAs and CEPA lack significant content in 
relation to Japanese concessions on agricultural trade and migrant labour. Moreover, 
Japan’s desire to block wider efforts to forge a more coherent East Asia-centred 
region, seen for instance in its foot-dragging on concluding an FTA with China which 
is a key step in completing a genuine region-wide FTA, may rebound upon it, as it 
finds itself potentially isolated from regional integration efforts.     
 
Japan’s extra-regional responses to China’s rise: a new containment? 
China’s expansion of its global power and the way in which this consequently boosted 
its regional power has necessitated from Japan a new global response, employing 
some new forms of power, and with varying levels of success, and demonstrating at 
times a tilt towards containment rather than engagement.  
 
Russia and Central Asia: playing the Great Game? 
Japan has first sought to engage with states that find themselves more on the 
immediate margins of East Asia, and to use these relationships to pry open the region 
to external influences and to curb Chinese power.24  Japan has attempted to articulate 
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a new strategic relationship with Russia. Japanese policy-makers, although not 
shelving the issue of the sovereignty of the Northern Territories, have resolved to 
pursue a more comprehensive set of relations in order to create the future basis for a 
resolution to the issue and in the meantime to bring Russia more on side with Japan’s 
wider strategic interests. Consequently, Koizumi in visiting Russia in May 2003 
initiated a Japan-Russia Action Plan, and his visit was followed up by Fukuda in April 
2008. The Action Plan outlines a range of areas for cooperation in economics, defence 
exchanges, and particularly energy development. Japan has offered up to US$8 billion 
of funding to ensure that the Taishet-Perevoznaya oil pipeline runs from Siberia to a 
final terminus in Sakhalin capable of transferring resources to Japan, rather than 
running through Chinese territory, and has also offered investment in Russia’s nuclear 
industry and manufacturing base.25 Russia has thus far wavered in its preferences of 
the final route for the pipeline and its trunk routes, but Japan in trying to cement its 
preferences has agreed that its Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation 
(JOGMEG) and the private Russian Irkutsk Oil Company will jointly explore oil 
fields in the Irkutsk region; an announcement timed to coincide with Fukuda’s 2008 
visit. Japan in seeking closer ties with Russia, and especially in the energy sector, is 
offering the latter a means to lessen its growing economic dependence on the Chinese 
market, to detach it from its ‘axis of convenience’ with China, and to reengage this 
other resurgent power in quietly balancing against China.26  
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Japan has simultaneously tried to engage in the ‘Great Game’ in Central Asia to arrest 
China’s growing influence. Japanese efforts to build relations with the Central Asian 
republics date back to Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō’s 1988 Silk Road Action 
Plan, which quickly led to Japan becoming the largest ODA donor to the region. 
Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yuriko made the first visit by a high-ranking minister to 
Central Asia in 2004, and then Koizumi visited the region in 2006, and then METI 
Minister Amari Akira in April 2007. Japan has pledged support for state-building and 
democracy consolidation, and concluded agreements with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 
for the development of uranium, gas and oil resources. Japan’s intentions in pursuing 
this ‘Central Asia-Plus Japan Process’ are clear in that it is looking to maintain the 
influence of the US and the West in Central Asia, especially after the expulsion of the 
US from its bases in Uzbekistan in 2005, and to counter China’s growing energy 
interests and influence in the region.  
However, Japan’s Russian and Central Asian demarches, whilst they may intimate to 
China the need to watch its back in these regions, face serious obstacles. Japan-Russia 
relations are jeopardised by Russia’s own reassertion of its military presence in East 
Asia, manifested in Japanese concerns over incursions by Russian bombers into its 
airspace in February 2008; Russian rhetoric against US Missile Defence (of which 
Japan’s BMD is a potentially a component); and Russia’s use of military force against 
Georgia in August 2008. Moreover, bilateral relations remain potentially hamstrung 
by the issue of the Northern Territories. Likewise, Japan’s engagement with the 
Central Asian Republics remains low-key and sporadic, and cannot rival China’s 
engagement with the region through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).  
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Japan, Australia and India: a concert of democracies? 
Japan to counter China’s rise has looked to the southern and western margins of the 
East Asia region for strengthened or new partnerships. Japanese policy-makers have 
entertained high hopes that Australia may be a viable partner to help cushion the 
impact of China’s rise. Japan and Australia have maintained good working relations 
in East Asia ever since the establishment of APEC, and Japan has of course looked to 
incorporate Australia as a ‘core member’ of its more expansive visions of East Asia 
regionalism and in the EAS process. Japan in recent years has looked, though, to 
complement this macro-regional engagement of Australia with deeper bilateral 
economic and security cooperation. Japan, in reaction to the initiation of negotiations 
for a China-Australia FTA in 2005 and new large-scale LNG deals, started its own 
negotiations for a Japan-Australia EPA in 2007 with a clear emphasis on securing 
access to Australia’s gas and uranium resources. Japan has held a Strategic Security 
Dialogue with Australia since 2005, and this led to the Japan-Australia Joint 
Declaration on Security Cooperation (JADSC) in March 2007. The JADSC stressed 
broad cooperation on issues such as non-proliferation and UN reform, and more 
‘sharp end’ military cooperation, including UNPKO, defence exchanges, search and 
rescue, and participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). 
Japan has similarly sought to engage India more fully to harness its rising power to 
curb that of China. Japan-India relations had been damaged by Japanese protests at its 
nuclear tests in 1998, including the suspension of loan aid. However, Japan, 
recognising the reality of India’s rise and its increasing strategic importance to the 
US, has moved to repair ties. Prime Minister Mori Yoshirō’s visit to India in 2000, the 
first visit for a decade by Japanese premier, produced an agreement for a bilateral 
‘Global Partnership in Twenty-First Century’. Koizumi visited in April 2005, 
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concluding a ‘Japan-India Partnership in a New Asian Era’; and then exchanges of 
visits between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Abe in November 2006 and 
August 2007 respectively produced an agreement on a ‘Japan-India Global and 
Strategic Partnership’. Japan in line with this partnership has now positioned India as 
its largest recipient of ODA and pledged assistance for the development of a Delhi-
Mumbai Industrial Corridor, and negotiations started for a Japan-India EPA in 
January 2007. Japan sees India as an important security partner, recognising in 
particular its growing maritime power projection capabilities to maintain the security 
of SLOCs from the Middle East to the Indian Ocean, and its ability to counter China’s 
influence via Myanmar in the Indian Ocean.27 Japan, moreover, has sought keenly to 
engage India in the EAS to match China’s rising influence, and to work in 
conjunction with India on UNSC reform. 
Japan’s further hope, especially under Abe and Asō, has been to engage Australia and 
India, alongside the US, in a quadrilateral mechanism to rebuff Chinese power. Abe 
and Asō, encouraged by the growing strength of US-Japan and US-Australia alliance 
ties in the wake of the ‘war on terror’, and by India’s seeming flirtation with US 
alignment, envisaged that these four powers could form a ‘concert of democracies’ to 
counter or even contain Chinese power. Abe made some significant progress on 
establishing a framework for quadrilateral dialogue, and in September 2007 the four 
states, with the addition of Singapore, conducted joint naval exercises in the Bay of 
Bengal. 
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Japanese horizons have extended even further than Australia and India to construct a 
concert of democracies. Japan has been attempting to activate its close ties with 
individual European states and the EU, and also to promote stronger ties with NATO, 
with one eye on buttressing its position vis-à-vis China. Hence, Abe during his visit to 
Europe in January 2007, including the first ever address of Japanese prime minister to 
the North Atlantic Council, stressed the importance of maintaining the embargo on 
arms exports to China. 
Japan’s attempts to bring Australia and India on side to respond to China’s rise again, 
though, face serious limitations. Japan’s EPA negotiations with Australia are 
hampered by its reluctance to open its markets for agricultural products; and Japan 
can only cooperate so far with Australia in security affairs due to its constitutional 
restrictions. 28  Japan, moreover, can only court Australian to a limited extent in 
counter-balancing China. Prime Minister John Howard’s government, despite its 
strengthening of the US-Australia alliance and interest in security ties with Japan, 
remained reluctant to allow security cooperation to trump growing economic ties with 
China. Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, although before becoming prime minister 
reportedly criticised the JADSC as threatening to ‘shut out China’ from the region, 
has maintained the agreement and put some flesh on it in his summit with Fukuda in 
Tokyo in April 2008. But Rudd was seen to snub Japan by failing to visit during his 
initial diplomatic tour of key partners earlier in 2008, and was clearly far more 
comfortable in stressing with Fukuda bilateral cooperation to engage rather than 
contain China.  
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In the same fashion, Japan-India ties may have limited mileage. Japan has been a 
relative latecomer to economic ties with India, constituting only the fifth largest 
export market for India and eighth largest source of imports. Japan and India, despite 
Japan’s pledging of support for the US-India Nuclear Agreement through the Nuclear 
Suppliers’ Group in 2008, still remain somewhat at loggerheads over the latter’s 
nuclear status. India for its part is also unlikely to allow itself to be tugged away from 
its position of non-alignment by Japan in order to balance China.  
Japan-EU relations are hampered by the fact that EU states have shown few signs of 
identifying as a China threat, despite some disaffection resulting from events in Tibet 
in 2008; and Japan-NATO relations are hobbled by Japan’s ban on the exercise of 
collective self-defence meaning that it is reluctant to despatch the JSDF on support 
missions to Afghanistan, the issue on which NATO is currently most desirous of 
Japanese assistance.  
 
Japan vs. China in the Middle East 
Japan’s pro-activism in trying to enlist extra-regional partners has also extended to as 
far as the Middle East. Japan’s policy in the Middle East has traditionally been split 
between its energy interests and its alliance relationship with the US.29 Japan has 
increasingly shifted towards its US alliance interests in recent years with its support 
for the US-led war in Iraq through the despatch of the GSDF and ASDF to Iraq and 
Kuwait between 2003 and 2008 to engage in reconstruction missions; and by its 
support for US, European Union (EU) and UN attempts to prevent Iran’s development 
of nuclear weapons. However, Japan has tried to maintain good relations with Middle 
                                                 
29 Yukiko Miyagi, Japan’s Middle East policy: theory and cases (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 34-58. 
 27
Eastern states through its continuing provision of ODA, financial support for the 
Palestinian Authority, and its sponsoring since March 2007 of a ‘Corridor for Peace 
and Prosperity’ involving economic Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian Cooperation.  
Japan, however, has had an additional motivation to boost its engagement with the 
Middle East due to China’s presence in the region’s energy markets. Japan has sought 
to head this off with Abe’s visits to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 
Kuwait, Qatar and Egypt in April 2007; the first by a Japanese premier to Saudi 
Arabia for four years, the first to the UAE and Qatar for twenty nine years, and the 
first ever to Kuwait. Abe sought to gain promises from these states for the 
continuation of stable oil and gas supplies. In addition, Japan since 2006 has launched 
EPA negotiations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Japan has also been 
driven to source additional energy supplies through a more aggressive strategy of 
acquiring stakes in specific energy developments. Japan’s Arabian Oil Company lost 
its concession rights in Saudi Arabia’s Khafji oilfields in 2003, and was thus forced to 
compensate through the partly state-owned Inpex Holding Incorporated’s taking of a 
stake in Iran’s Azadegan oilfields.  
Japan thus seems to have been obliged by rising competition from China and other 
emerging energy consumers, including India, to resort to the sort of old-style energy 
diplomacy that it originally practiced during the first Oil Shock of the early 1970s—
moving away from reliance on the working of free energy markets and instead 
looking to more mercantile national control of specific resources in the Middle East. 
Indeed, Japanese policy-makers have mooted whether Japan should establish its own 
sovereign wealth fund to help invest in and lockup key energy resources in the Middle 
East and Africa, and the LDP has been studying the concept since April 2008.  
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But Japan’s anxieties about its energy position in the Middle East vis-à-vis China are 
likely to remain despite recent diplomatic activity. Japan again looks like a reactive 
latecomer in is renewed energy diplomacy, Abe’s visit coming after President Hu’s 
visit to Saudi Arabia in April 2006. Japan has furthermore been obliged since 2006 to 
scale back Inpex’s stake in the Azadegan oil field from seventy five to ten per cent to 
comply with international efforts to pressure Iran to halt its nuclear programme.  
 
Japan and China in the ‘new scramble for Africa’ 
Japan has demonstrated renewed interest in Africa, driven in large part by China’s 
increasing moves to acquire greater access to its raw resources. Japan, despite having 
engaged Africa since the 1970s through the provision of large scale ODA and through 
the convening since 1993 of the Tokyo International Conference on African 
Development (TICAD), had allocated a relatively low policy emphasis to this region 
until the start of the new century.30 Japanese policy-makers and businessmen have 
returned to focus on Africa for a variety of reasons. Japan requires African diplomatic 
support for its UNSC permanent seat bid, seeks to play a constructive role in African 
economic development bilaterally and through the G-8 process, and is increasingly 
aware of the importance of African natural resources in the midst of rising resource 
prices and China’s growing presence on the continent. Japan has thus sought to 
engage more deeply with Africa through reinvigorating the TICAD process. The 
Japanese government during the TICAD-IV conference in Tokyo in May 2008 
depicted the forum as something of an alternative to the China-Africa summit of 
2006, and Japan attempted to purvey a model of economic growth inspired by its own 
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and Asia’s developmental experience that contrasted from both the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ and ‘Beijing Consensus’ in emphasising African ‘ownership’ of the 
process and a mix of state and private sector led development.31 Japan furthermore 
pledged at the TICAD-IV that it would double its ODA to Africa by 2012. Japan has 
also tried to engage Africa more in security terms. Japan to counter China’s influence 
in Somalia has explored the possibility of despatching the JSDF on the UN-African 
mission PKO in Darfur; and since March 2009 has despatched two MSDF destroyers 
on anti-piracy missions in the Gulfs of Somalia and Aden.  
Japan’s attempts to counter China’s influence in Africa, as in other regions, though, 
have been subject to mixed fortunes. Japan’s TICAD-IV did not yield the results 
hoped for, with African leaders showing some disappointment at the size of Japan’s 
ODA pledges and still preferring the conditionality-free economic gains to be made 
from dealing with China.32 Japan will certainly face difficulties in doubling its ODA 
given its tight aid budget and its lack of actual human resources on the ground to 
deliver the aid. African leaders have in general become increasingly lukewarm as well 
to Japan’s proposals for UNSC reform. Japan thus may need to settle for not exerting 
any form of overall leadership in Africa, but simply trying to persuade China to cut 
Japan back into affairs with Africa by working together through their Bilateral 
Consultations on Africa, and the Trilateral Dialogue involving South Korea. Japan’s 
security engagement in Africa also remains limited. Japan, due to its fear of becoming 
involved in combat missions, has been able to only despatch two GSDF liaison 
officers to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) headquarters in Khartoum, in contrast 
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to China’s three hundred troops despatched to Darfur itself. Japanese policy-makers, 
moreover, have been frustrated that China has been able to despatch two destroyers to 
the Gulf of Somalia since December 2008, whereas Japan was not able to do so until 
March 2009 and is still engaged in efforts to work through cumbersome domestic 
political and legal frameworks to enable the passing of a new anti-piracy law to 
strengthen the mandate of the MSDF mission. 
 
‘An Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’, and UN Reform: failing soft power 
Japan has attempted to further leverage the influence of these extra-regional 
relationships in its strategy to counter China’s rise by articulating the concept of their 
forming an ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’. The concept originated in Abe’s 
determination for Japan to posit a more assertive and values-oriented foreign policy 
based on the so-called ‘universal’ values of freedom, democracy, human rights, the 
rule of law, and market economy. Asō, during his tenure as Foreign Minister, 
subsequently unveiled in November 2006 Japan’s promotion of such an arc stretching 
from Northeast Asia through Southeast Asia, Central Asia, the Caucuses, Central 
Europe, Eastern Europe and the Baltic States. Japan’s clear intent was, in a similar 
way to its proposals for the EAS, to differentiate its attempts at regional and global 
leadership from those of China, and to create a new rationale for expanding its extra-
regional strategic partnerships beyond the US.33
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Japan’s dabbling with values-based diplomacy and the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity 
has proved short-lived in the end.34 The Japanese concept was read immediately as an 
attempt to encircle and contain Chinese influence. Japan’s use of the language of 
freedom and prosperity was seen reminiscent of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere of the wartime period, and the promotion of freedom and democracy did not 
seem a convincing platform given its support in the past for authoritarian regimes in 
East Asia. Hence, Fukuda after taking power quietly jettisoned Abe and Asō’s 
concept, to rely instead on more traditional pragmatic diplomacy.  
Japan’s coming up short in trying to construct a values-based coalition to counter 
China has been reflected in a similar failure to gain any international traction on 
UNSC reform plans. Japanese policy-makers are desirous of a permanent seat as 
recognition of their state’s great power ranking and funding of up to twenty per cent 
of the organisation’s budget; because they feel that the current constituency of P5 
members is too representative of the immediate post-war settlement and ill-equipped 
to deal with new forms of regional problems; and because they are aware that as their 
state’s relative power position slips they may eventually fail to deploy the necessary 
financial resources to vault into a position that will guarantee them parity with 
China’s existing P5 status. Japan’s proposals for expanding permanent seats to 
include the G-4 of itself, Germany, India and Brazil, and two African states failed to 
make headway in 2005. Japan’s membership bid was undermined by eventual African 
disunity over the G-4 proposals; lack of Japanese clarity over its actual plans for the 
valued-added of a permanent seat for itself; US passivity in pushing Japan’s 
candidature; and most crucially in Japanese eyes by China’s behind-the-scenes 
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orchestration of opposition. Japan will persist with plans for UNSC reform, as to 
admit failure would be to acknowledge its relegation to the ranks of the lesser powers. 
But Japan’s failure to instrumentalise UNSC reform, and China’s hand in this, only 
adds to Japanese consideration of the need to switch to containment strategies vis-à-
vis China.  
 
Conclusion: Japan on the defensive and towards default containment? 
Japanese policy-makers remain determined to marshal their national resources to 
secure vital interests in the face of China’s rise, and to not readily cede regional 
leadership to their Chinese counterparts. To this end, Japan’s default strategy towards 
China remains one of engagement. Japan has attempted to maintain the relationship 
with China through activating bilateral frameworks for engagement, and by trying to 
embed the Japan-China relationship within a relatively symmetrical framework 
involving the reassuring presence of the US. Japan has continued to rely on economic 
power as its principal means to engage China, but in maintaining the US presence has 
increasingly expanded US-Japan military alliance cooperation and its own national 
military capabilities. Japan’s bilateral and trilateral engagement of China has arguably 
paid considerable dividends as both sides have striven to enhance cooperation in 
politics, economics, and increasingly security.  
Japan’s engagement strategy of China has taken broader form through the new 
opportunities for interaction offered by the rise of regionalism in the post-Cold War 
period, and both sides have made significant progress in areas for functional 
cooperation such as finance. However, for Japan, regional frameworks have 
increasingly assumed the character of arenas for channelling, and if necessary 
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curbing, Chinese rising power. Japan has promoted its preferred format of the EAS to 
counter China’s preference for the APT, to dilute its rising power, and to check its 
perceived pretensions for regional leadership. Japan has similarly used regional EPAs 
and CEPs to deflect China’s influence, and seems bent on deliberately ‘over-
supplying’ regionalism so as to diffuse China’s ability to concentrate its power in any 
one forum.  
Japan meanwhile has been working proactively on a series of extra-regional and 
global so-called ‘strategic partnerships’ in order to further encumber China’s free 
projection of its power outside East Asia. Japan has hoped for closer ties with Russia, 
Central Asia, Australia, India, the Middle East, Europe and Africa to curb Chinese 
influence in these regions and thereby curb also Chinese influence in East Asia itself. 
Japan has again used economic power to activate these relationships, but also shown a 
new willingness to assert military power and to experiment with ‘soft’ ideological 
power, as in the concept of the ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’. Japan’s global 
strategy is new not only in geographical scope and the utilisation of different power 
resources, but also in that at times it has demonstrated a propensity to actively contain 
China’s influence.  
Japanese policy-makers clearly hope this double strategy of engaging China in East 
Asia and soft containment globally will oblige Chinese policy-makers to come to an 
accommodation with Japan’s legitimate economic and security concerns and with its 
continuing leadership aspirations in East Asia. In this way, China’s rise and Japan’s 
relative decline can be carefully managed, and hopefully for the benefit of region-
building in East Asia.  
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Japan’s strategy is, though, risk-laden. Japan’s attempt to engage China in East Asia 
through containment elsewhere clearly runs the risk of a hostile Chinese counter-
reaction if it succeeds or is not sufficiently carefully calibrated to assuage Chinese 
concerns at being contained. Japan’s strategy is placed in greater peril, however, if it 
simply is shown to be ineffective in exerting some influence on China’s rise, thereby 
provoking a far stronger counter-reaction from Japan itself. 
Japan’s bilateral and trilateral engagement frameworks for engaging China in East 
Asia are built on precarious foundations. Japan’s domestic constituency for engaging 
China has held for the moment, but as the LDP’s grip on power slips, then the 
Revisionists are increasingly likely to search for legitimacy and to fulfil their political 
doctrine by pressing a nationalist agenda often directed against China. Japanese 
policy-makers’ hesitation to engage China may be compounded by the failure to 
achieve progress on key bilateral projects. For instance, Japan’s government has 
already lodged protests with China since January 2009 over its continuing exploration 
of gas fields in the East China Sea in contravention of the centrepiece agreement of 
the mutually beneficial partnership.  
Japan’s failure of bilateral engagement with China is matched by a similar risk of the 
failure of trilateral engagement with China. Japan must hope that as it increasingly 
throws in its security lot with the US there is no serious increase in Sino-US security 
tensions, or it risks becoming entrapped in an active US containment policy of China 
and even military conflict. Japan’s other fear must be that its does not again 
experience a policy of US ‘passing’ of Japan for China, something particularly 
provoked by the advent of a new Democratic administration in the US. In this 
instance, Japan may feel that it has lost the reassurance of the US security backstop to 
fend off China’s regional rise. Japan may be reassured thus far by the new Barak 
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Obama administration, with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton choosing Japan as the 
destination for her first overseas visit in February 2009, and Asō being the first 
foreign leader to visit the new President in the White House the following month. 
However, Clinton’s apparent cozying up to Beijing on the latter part of her Asia tour 
has not inspired confidence that the US is willing to back exclusively Japan’s cause in 
the region.  
Japan in the event of the undermining of its engagement policy may then need to 
contemplate shifting to emphasising a default containment strategy of China. Japan 
inevitably would seek to do this through stronger US-Japan alliance ties, but in the 
event that the US relationship is not seen to function for its interests, then by 
activating its own military power. Japan might thus then be returned to its long-feared 
scenario of having to fend for its own security and full remilitarisation, which would 
then only lead it into a destructive downward security dilemma with China. The 
destructive impact for East Asia region-building attempts, with the region denied 
opportunities for cooperation between its two leading powers, are obvious. Similarly, 
open Japan and Chinese rivalry may spill over into full competition for influence in 
other regions. Japan may probably lose this competition, but only after considerable 
disruption is inflicted upon these other regions’ development and integration efforts.   
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